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1 (Proceedings heard in open court:) 2 THE COURT: Good morning, Jackie. 3 THE CLERK: Good morning, Judge. Today's date is 4 January 14th, 2021, Judge Gary Feinerman presiding. 5 18 CR 450, USA versus David Walsh. 6 THE COURT: Who do we have for the government? 7 MR. VEATCH: Good morning, your Honor. Christopher Veatch on behalf of the United States. 8 9 THE COURT: And defense counsel? 10 MR. BOYLE: Good morning, Judge. Patrick Boyle on 11 behalf of Mr. David Walsh, who's joining us via video from 12 the MCC in custody. 13 THE COURT: Okay. And we had a CARES Act order 14 entered yesterday, I believe. 15 MR. BOYLE: Yes, your Honor. 16 THE COURT: And do we have the Probation Office on 17 the line? 18 MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Yes, Judge. Good morning. This 19 is Jason Christiansen with the U.S. Probation Office. P1ease 20 forgive me. I'm having some real connectivity issues. That's 21 why I called in. 22 THE COURT: That's fine. I actually see you on video 23 right now, too. 24 We're here for the continuation of the sentencing 25 hearing. What I was planning on doing is this; and if you

think things ought to proceed in a different way, please let me know, and I'll consider your suggestion. I was -- the first part, I was going to complete the sentencing as I had intended to complete it before Mr. Walsh's -- THE DEFENDANT: Rant.

THE COURT: -- for lack of a better word,

supplemental allocution. And in that, I was also going to take into account the revision to the PSR and Mr. Walsh's supplemental brief that he filed yesterday.

I then was going to address and ask for the parties' input on whether a different sentence is warranted in light of Mr. Walsh's supplemental allocution.

Mr. Boyle, would you like to proceed otherwise?

MR. BOYLE: No. That makes sense to us, your Honor.

THE COURT: Government?

MR. VEATCH: No, your Honor. We've reviewed the supplemental briefing from yesterday and are prepared to respond orally to the extent your Honor would like to hear from us.

THE COURT: That's fine. And because the first part -- in the first part, I was going to consider the supplemental briefing, why don't I hear from the government right now, and then I'll bring it back to Mr. Boyle if he has any kind of a reply.

MR. VEATCH: Thank you, your Honor. The supplemental

briefing's focus -- or one of its focuses is on the Court's reliance on the firearm being loaded during the July 14th bank robbery; and defendant argues that there is no evidence of that, and the Court's reliance on the firearm being loaded in reaching its sentence was perhaps overweighted with regard to that.

The government argues that the Court was correct the first time around. While there is no direct evidence, there is no admission by the defendant that the firearm was loaded, we do know, as the Court pointed out at the October 6 hearing, that defendant is a meticulous planner who appears, more than a preponderance of the evidence, to have followed the same game plan, except for the inclusion of a driver in the second robbery, with regard to the items that he used, the tools of the trade that he used in these bank robberies, which were only 10 days apart.

Specifically, at the time he was arrested on July 24th, he had in his possession what appeared to be the same hat, the same mask, the same light blue shirt and head covering. He had door stoppers, sunglasses, items that he appears to have had all during the July 14th robbery, as well as the same firearm.

And it lends itself -- or it just makes sense -- it makes less sense to disbelieve that that firearm would have been loaded -- would have been unloaded during the prior bank

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robbery, where the defendant even said, "I'm not playing," why
he would go in unloaded on that day where he was successful
and then unloaded on another day, when we know in fact the
defendant, from his criminal history as well, when he has
possessed actual firearms, as in this case, they have been
loaded. And I point to the prior UUW. Granted, the
conviction was reversed. The conduct still applies.
         And so the government would just support your Honor's
prior findings that based on the evidence before the Court,
it's more likely than not that firearm was loaded on
July 14th. And in the alternative, we would argue even if it
wasn't, the Court was absolutely correct with regard to the
sentence based on the facts before the Court at that point,
that given the nature of the offense and the criminal history
of the defendant, the Court was correct in assessing how
significant that offense was, loaded or unloaded.
         THE COURT: Mr. Boyle?
         THE DEFENDANT:
                         He's off on --
         THE COURT: Yeah, you're -- I think you're on mute,
Mr. Boyle.
                     No, I -- can you hear me now?
         MR. BOYLE:
         THE COURT: Yes.
         THE DEFENDANT: Yeah.
         MR. BOYLE: Can you hear me, your Honor?
         THE COURT:
                     Yes.
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MR. BOYLE: Okay. Thank you. Just as I state in the supplemental briefing, as you noted, Mr. Walsh is meticulous; but I think the parties and certainly the U.S. Attorney's Office is also meticulous in the language they use. I mean, I think it's very significant that the counts involving July 14th, there is plenty of language in the superseding indictment regarding the offense in that case; but at no time is the weapon characterized as being loaded. In the written plea agreement that obviously they worked on very carefully, in the two counts involving the July 14th incident, again, the weapon is described. The actions of Mr. Walsh are described in detail. At no point is it alleged that --(Audio cuts out.) THE COURT: You -- Mr. Boyle, I'm sorry to interrupt. Could you go back about 20 seconds? Because you -- your audio faded out. MR. BOYLE: Again, Judge, just for the record, I'm perfectly comfortable just pausing this for a minute --(Audio cuts out.)

THE COURT: And you faded out again, Mr. Boyle. I'm so sorry.

MR. BOYLE: No. For whatever reason, this case has been giving me issues regarding the connections. I'm perfectly comfortable calling in with just my audio. Is that

1 okay with everybody? 2 THE COURT: Sure. So, why don't you keep your video, 3 mute yourself on the video, and then call in on the phone. 4 MR. BOYLE: Okay. I will try to do that as quickly 5 as possible. 6 (Short interruption.) 7 MR. BOYLE: Well, I don't know. Can you hear me now? 8 THE COURT: Yes. MR. BOYLE: Okay. I guess we can try it this way 9 10 again. 11 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Boyle, I believe you got cut 12 off where you talked about the July 14th -- the written plea 13 agreement, the actions of Mr. Walsh are described in detail. 14 At no point is it alleged that -- and at that point, you got 15 cut off. 16 THE DEFENDANT: Now you're off again. 17 THE COURT: Mr. Walsh, I'll direct traffic, please. 18 THE DEFENDANT: Okay. Fine. No problems there. 19 THE COURT: Yeah, we're having trouble hearing you. 20 MR. BOYLE: When anyone else starts talking, it 21 becomes completely distorted, and I've tried to call in using 22 the regular phone-in number. I enter the meeting ID, and 23 nothing happens. 24 THE COURT: Jackie, any suggestions for Mr. Boyle? 25 THE CLERK: And you tried calling in and you said it

1 gets -- you don't get a chance to log in? 2 MR. BOYLE: I'm going to try to call in again. 3 THE CLERK: Yes. But you seem fine now, though, 4 SO --5 THE DEFENDANT: We can hear you now. I'm almost 6 sure. I can hear you moving around. 7 THE CLERK: No. 8 MR. BOYLE: Okay. Again, I tried to call in on the 9 Cisco meeting landline; but after I entered the meeting code, 10 it didn't go through, or nothing happened. 11 THE COURT: Well, right now, we can hear you. 12 MR. BOYLE: Okay. We'll try. 13 So, again, Judge, I think it's just very significant 14 that nowhere in the superseding indictment in the counts 15 regarding July 14th is the weapon described as being loaded; 16 in the written plea agreement that my client signed off on to 17 and entered into, there's no language anywhere that it was 18 loaded. At one point in the process of taking the plea, 19 Mr. Walsh himself suggested that that gun wasn't loaded. 20 So, I think it is a significant factor, and it was 21 It was not pled -- he didn't plead guilty to never alleged. 22 that significant fact. It's not contained in the written 23 plea agreement. He does make that statement, as the 24 government notes, "I'm not playing," but he doesn't say, "This

weapon's loaded." He doesn't have his finger on the trigger.

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It's not pointed at the tellers. It's briefly displayed, again, as I think as we previously argued, not to terrorize anyone, but to get quick compliance, get the funds he received, and get out of there as quick as possible.

And I think that's the evidence. And you take all of that together. I don't think it's fair to make that assumption, and it is an assumption based upon just circumstantial evidence related to the subsequent incident; but it is an assumption, and it's not warranted by the actual language of the superseding indictment or the written plea agreement that Mr. Walsh entered into.

So, I would just argue that your Honor would please revisit that analysis and not -- not make that assumption in calculating what is a fair and reasonable sentence for the incident involving July 14th and the possession of that weapon. So thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you. So, I'm going to -THE DEFENDANT: Judge, could I say something? I
wanted to --

THE COURT: Hold on, Mr. Walsh.

Mr. Boyle, Mr. Walsh wants to say something. I don't know if you would like to advise him.

MR. BOYLE: Mr. Walsh, I've briefed the issue in writing, and I've also just argued it orally. I'm not sure what more can be said on the issue.

1 THE DEFENDANT: What can be said is that the 2 picture -- I don't care --3 MR. BOYLE: I referenced the picture. 4 And, your Honor, yes, we did attach a photograph, a 5 still photograph that was provided by the government which 6 shows the July 14 bank robbery. It shows Mr. Walsh in 7 possession of the firearm. His finger's not on the trigger. 8 And Mr. Walsh is suggesting that if you look at the image, 9 you can see the chamber of the weapon, and --10 THE DEFENDANT: The chamber is empty. 11 MR. BOYLE: His argument is that that chamber is 12 empty. You would not be able to see through, essentially, 13 the chamber if it had been loaded. 14 THE COURT: All right. Government, any thoughts on 15 that? 16 You're on mute. 17 MR. VEATCH: Your Honor, I'm pulling up the picture 18 now. 19 Your Honor, I think -- the issue we have with that 20 assumption is, one, it's a poor picture. Two, every firearm 21 is different. We would want some sort of testimony or some 22 sort of example from an actual -- the actual firearm to see 23 whether or not the bullets would be visible or the area that 24 would be not visible. 25 And I apologize, counselor, which -- if I may, your

1 Honor, which part of the firearm are you saying you would be 2 able to see through or not see through if it was loaded? And 3 I'm looking at your exhibit to the supplemental sentencing 4 memo. 5 THE DEFENDANT: The chambers --6 MR. BOYLE: I assume the argument is that --7 THE DEFENDANT: The bullets, where the bullets are 8 located, you can blow that up as much as you want. They're 9 not going to see any -- you're not going to see any bullets 10 in the gun. There's no bullets in the gun. 11 MR. VEATCH: Your Honor, I would just say that based 12 on this image, it is -- and I understand defendant's 13 argument that the cylinders --14 THE DEFENDANT: It is my --15 THE COURT: Mr. Walsh, it's not your place right now. 16 MR. VEATCH: We understand the argument that the 17 cylinders would be empty on an unloaded firearm if you were 18 viewing it at the correct angle. We would argue that this 19 image is not one from which we can draw that conclusion. 20 THE DEFENDANT: That's not true. 21 THE COURT: All right. 22 THE DEFENDANT: You can bank on that, because looking 23 down from that point of view, it would be noticeable. That's 24 probably why I did what I did. 25 When you buy a gun off the street, they don't give

you bullets. I don't know how many guns you've bought off the street, but any guns I bought off the street, you know what I'm saying, they give you the guns. You know, you get the ammo later.

What I'm saying is there was no bullets in that particular weapon at that time.

I know I can't challenge the 924(c)(1)(A) because basically, the plea was withdrawn -- I mean, it was denied on the plea being withdrawn. I understand that. I'm just saying I'd like a fair shake.

MR. VEATCH: Your Honor, if I may, counsel pointed out that Mr. Walsh, during the change of plea hearing, noted that the gun did not have any bullets. We would just remind everybody Mr. Walsh also initially took the position that it was a replica firearm before conceding that, in fact, it was real. So, as to a credibility issue, there is certainly that. That's on page 66 of the February 20th, 2020, transcript.

MR. BOYLE: That's correct, Judge. And he withdrew that, and he pled guilty to the two counts involving the July 14th incident and the possession of that weapon.

But again, he never pled guilty to being in possession of a loaded weapon on July 14th or engaging in a bank robbery with a loaded weapon. That's --

(Audio cuts out.)

THE COURT: You just faded out, Mr. Boyle.

MR. BOYLE: Reasonable minds can disagree about that, but I don't think we can disagree about what he was specifically charged --

(Audio cuts out.)

THE COURT: Yeah, Mr. Boyle, your audio is messed up. I think if you could start again after, "But again, he never pled guilty to being in possession of a loaded weapon on July 14th or engaging in a bank robbery with a loaded weapon," and then you cut out.

MR. BOYLE: Okay. That's essentially it, Judge. It's what he was specifically charged with. It's what he specifically pled guilty to. And none of that -- I think where I broke off was that Mr. Walsh is suggesting that the photograph that we attached as the exhibit is dispositive on the issue of whether the gun was loaded. I think reasonable minds can disagree about that.

But the bottom line is that no one can disagree with what he was specifically charged with and what he actually pled guilty to. None of that involved an allegation or an admission of the possession of a loaded firearm on that day. And, therefore, your Honor's assumption, however reasonable that may be, I think it was just given too much weight, considering the actual charge and what he pled guilty to.

And again, we would ask you to revisit that and take a fresh look at the aggravating factors that may or may not

have existed on that July 14th incident.

THE COURT: All right. I appreciate both sides' arguments on this. I'm going to stick with my initial view that the gun was loaded on July 14th.

True -- I agree with Mr. Boyle. He's correct. The indictment doesn't charge that the weapon was loaded, but it didn't have to charge that the weapon was loaded in order to properly charge a bank robbery. The plea agreement didn't -- didn't admit -- Mr. Walsh didn't admit in the plea agreement that the gun was loaded; but the plea agreement is an agreement, so Mr. Walsh didn't have to admit that. And there was a factual basis for the plea of guilty of the July 14th bank robbery, even without the gun being loaded.

Mr. Boyle also correctly said that the teller told the FBI that she didn't believe it was a real gun, but we have Mr. Walsh's admission in his plea agreement that it was a real gun, a .357-caliber recover --

THE DEFENDANT: After I got browbeat from this statement, right after I told you that the gun wasn't real.

"THE COURT: Sure. I see our factual basis floating out of the courtroom and down Dearborn Street, which would require that we have a trial on Monday."

That's heavy-handed browbeating somebody down.

I took that plea in good faith to get 123 months. If you got all three points, you got 123 months for that

plea.

I'm just saying, I'm sorry for the rant that I did on October 6th. I truly mean it. But looking at what I pled to and what the plea agreement is, I didn't expect you to try to go over and raise my category to a category IV and jack me with another three years on top of that other 123 months. I didn't expect it.

I mean, you can do this, but I'm trying to -- what I'm trying to do and what Mr. Boyle and I are trying to do is get you to see that maybe that the 96 months is a little bit harsh for the COVID-19 and all the rest of everything else that's going on. Maybe you could give a downward departure for my age or whatever.

And in that downward departure, you could cut time off of the 96 to maybe 36 months, with the 60 months for the 924(c)(1)(A) that I can't do anything about. That's true. I can't do anything about that. You ruled on that. I accept your ruling.

All I'm trying to do is trying to not die in prison, okay, over something that -- what I'm charged with and what happened and what went down is not worth dying in prison over.

I can see your point of view where you feel that I'm just going to go out there and do the same thing again. I understand this. By my record, I see it. But I did try out there as hard as I could. Okay? I was out there nine

times longer than I was at any other time. I know nine months doesn't seem like anything. It could have been -- whatever.

I got into financial distress. I did what I did. All right.

That being said, I didn't want to hurt anybody.

I never had no intention on hurting anybody. If I had intentions on hurting anybody, with or without a loaded gun, I would have acted entirely differently. I had all the chances in the world at blowing people away and everything else. I don't -- I'm not a nut. I'm not on that.

I'm 74 years old. I'm kind of tired of the whole -the whole thing. All I want to do is do the minimum amount
of time that I can and get out and get vocational training.
That's all.

If I had the vocational training, I wouldn't even be in here. It would be -- I wouldn't be in this courtroom. We wouldn't be having this. If I had had a livable wage out there, I wouldn't be here. That's what I was trying to impart to you the whole time.

I can understand where you could look at my background and you can say, "Well, hey, I feel that he never learned anything and that he's just going to go out there and repeat offender again and do these things." All I'm asking for is a chance to get back out into the free world at some reasonable time.

156 months is beyond what I might be able to do. I'm

74 years old. I'm not a kid no more. If I just had the 60 months for the 924(c), I could probably lay out here, finish this time, get some culinary training while I'm inside, and come out and do this thing. I could be a cook. I could drive a truck.

I don't want to die in prison. Should I die in prison over -- because of my past record? My past record's got nothing to do with this other. I know you can look at it, but it really shouldn't be looked at like that. A 32-year-old letter that you looked at is not like it was yesterday. This was 32 years ago. I spent 60 months in prison. I was out of contact, no training, nothing. I got a GED. You know that.

All I'm saying is that -- I took a couple of courses while I've been in here on budgeting and credit and stuff like that, financing. All I'm trying to do is say that I'm truly sorry for any inconvenience I might have caused you or inconvenience. Okay? I'm truly sorry about it.

If I could do everything over again, I would have had culinary training, and I wouldn't have been in the position that I'm in, period. Trust me, I just -- I'm just -- I don't know what to say. You know?

I kind of went off because I was looking at some sentence disparity on a couple of other cases, and I realize when I look at them now that their backgrounds are not my backgrounds. My case is an entirely different case from

anybody else's case, period.

I realize that I've got a terrible past and that I got -- and it looks like repeat performances over and over again. I did try, and I did try really hard. Physically, what happened with my knees and my hands in them freezers is what made me realize that I can't keep doing what I'm doing and maintain it.

And I should have -- I don't know. I panicked, I guess. I had bad thoughts, and the old thoughts came back, and I went on with that bad thought. The thoughts were wrong. I shouldn't have done it. I see the errors of my ways.

You know, if I'm given a chance for vocational training, I believe I can do some type of good, really, seriously. If I'm sentenced to 156 months, that's an awful long time. I might not survive 156 months. I'm looking at it truthfully. That -- and all that together with what I was looking at, the sentence disparity and you upping my category to a category IV when you were basing something off of a 1964 conviction when, in fact, that conviction did not involve a firearm, you agreed on that in the last court appearance. I would argue that putting me in a category IV is just not the thing to do. You could do it under statute.

It's like this. Guidelines are advisory. I realize this. You could take and give me anything that you want to.

It's your power to do that. I realize that. I was just upset

with the sentence because I'm looking at 154 months, and I'm 74 years old right now. I don't know if I've got that much time left in my body. And to sentence me to that would be like a life sentence for me to die in prison.

Now, my past caught up with me in the 1987 armed robbery. They gave me 30 years, in all reality, to kill me so that I would die in prison. I'm looking at that reality.

I got out. Instead of sentencing me -- or sending me to a halfway house, they sent me to a transition center where they don't even feed you. So, immediately I had to start, you know, doing other things to get money to get food and stuff.

Then I had to start -- they'd parole me from one false identity to a new identity. That was my fault, my -- also, daily. It took me over a month or so to get that straightened out so that I could finally get my ID to go to work.

I started going to work every day, early in the morning, way early in the morning, late at night. I kept going to the -- to work. I kept going to work to get my apartment together, to get the rent together, to get furniture together, to get everything together. I had to work hard to do this, and I was working hard to do it. I'm not trying to be a smart-ass and clever and all the rest of the -- anything deceitful.

I realize what I said to you was bad. I realize how I felt at that time. It just -- it just made me go off into a different mindset because 156 months, to me, I might not live -- we don't know how long we've got left to live. The COVID-19 is real. It's very real. People are dying in prison.

I realize that you could sentence me to anything you want to sentence me to because you could have done so just by statute. You could just say, "The Guidelines say this, but I feel this, and on the statute, I could sentence you to whatever it is that I want to sentence you to anyway."

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Walsh, one second.

You know, I -- I've reminded you on probably a dozen occasions during this case that whatever you say, even if you think you may be helping yourself, could end up hurting yourself; and, therefore, I advised you to let your lawyer speak for you rather than have you speak for yourself, other than at allocution, which, of course, is your statement.

So, I didn't feel the need to remind you again, but you've been going on for so long that I thought I would step in and remind you of that again.

THE DEFENDANT: Is there anything I've said so far that seems to be harmful that I've said so far to you?

THE COURT: Mr. Walsh, I'd advise you to not go any further. I'm going to give you a chance to give a statement

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during the second half of the sentencing hearing if I decide that a sentence higher than the one I was going to give you is warranted. So, I'd advise you to stop right now. THE DEFENDANT: All right. I'm stopping. THE COURT: But it's up to you. I'm not going to --THE DEFENDANT: I've said all that I need to say. I'm pretty -- you know where -- you know -- you know what I --I've tried to communicate to you, so, hey, I've done the best that I can do. Now, my lawyer, you're going to have to try to get in touch with him. I don't know how this is working out. keeps having technical difficulties. 13 THE COURT: Are you still with us, Mr. Boyle? 14 MR. BOYLE: Yes, Judge. I don't know if you can see I'm on the audio call now, which is a much better connection for me. THE COURT: I can see you and hear you. 18 MR. BOYLE: Okay. Thank you. THE COURT: So, in looking at the gun, the photo of Mr. Walsh during the July 14th robbery, he's holding a gun; and the gun looks -- well, he admitted it was the .357 22 revolver in the plea agreement, and that admission is 23 confirmed by comparing the photo of the weapon at doc 134-1 24 at page 1, which is July 14th, and comparing that with the photo of the firearm that was recovered on July 24th, which

is docket 101 at page 36. That's the same weapon.

I do not see any indication from this photo that the firearm -- the photo of the July 14th robbery, that the firearm was not loaded. Mr. Walsh has been telling us that the firearm was not loaded. I find that that's not credible. As the government pointed out, for quite some time, Mr. Walsh was saying, this was before his plea, that it was a replica weapon, which, of course, it wasn't. So, that was a misrepresentation of the facts. And I would find by a preponderance of the evidence, well over a preponderance of the evidence, that the gun Mr. Walsh had at the July 14th robbery was a real gun and that it was loaded.

When Mr. Walsh was arrested before he was able to complete what would have been the July 24th robbery, he was found with a loaded .357 revolver. The most logical inference, and I think the only logical inference, is that Mr. Walsh had the same weapon also loaded for the July 14th robbery. I can think of no reason why Mr. Walsh would have brought a loaded .357 to the July 24th robbery, or what would have been the July 24th robbery, but not to what actually was the July 14th robbery, which took place.

And Mr. Walsh's criminal history shows that he has a great comfort with and a great affinity for firearms, loaded firearms, and willingness to use them.

At the end of the day, this particular issue does not

move the needle -- would not have moved the needle on the ultimate sentence I imposed because it's undisputed that Mr. Walsh was bringing a loaded .357 to the -- what would have been July 24th robbery, and that's extremely serious conduct; and even if I had found that he didn't bring the loaded weapon -- that the weapon wasn't loaded at the July 14th robbery, it would not have made a difference to my determination of the sentence, as I intended to give it back in October.

There's also the second issue in Mr. Walsh's supplemental brief, which has to do with the 1964 armed robbery involving not a firearm, as I had initially thought, but rather, just a knife. And the brief argues that because the 1964 robbery, which is reflected at paragraph 55 of the PSR, involved just a knife rather than a gun, I should revisit my determination that there was an appropriate 4A1.3(a) departure raising Mr. Walsh's criminal history from III to IV. And of course, the -- that 1964 armed robbery didn't carry any criminal history points.

So, I don't know if the government has any thoughts on that.

You're on mute.

MR. VEATCH: Thank you, your Honor. Your Honor actually addressed this issue during the October 6th hearing, according to the transcript at 21, going into 22. When the

issue was raised about whether this was, in fact, an armed robbery or how significant it would have been or not, the Court made clear that with or without that armed robbery, the prior murder plus the conduct in which Mr. Walsh was found with a loaded .38-caliber revolver, loaded 12-gauge shotgun, and loaded Uzi, along with numerous rounds of ammunition, and I'm quoting, "The murder plus that one certainly more than warrant an upward departure of one criminal history category level."

The government would agree with the Court's prior finding, as well as adding the additional criminal conduct as reflected in the PSR that did not receive criminal history points, including the obstruction of justice that involved Mr. Walsh having a handcuff key or having been found with a handcuff key or contraband at a penal institution, as well as -- now, this was -- as well as even if the Court did not depart upward with regard to criminal history, under 3553(a), the ultimate result the Court resulted in, in light of the other conduct described, especially the non-criminal violations while in custody, in addition to the conduct we've discussed, would certainly warrant where the Court landed.

THE COURT: Mr. Boyle?

MR. BOYLE: Well, Judge, again, hopefully you all can hear me.

THE COURT: We can.

MR. BOYLE: Thank you, Judge. I mean, as we state in our pleading, I do think it is significant. I don't -- I don't think anyone would question your Honor being troubled if there was another incident where Mr. Walsh had used a firearm to engage in some kind of theft or robbery.

I think even from the beginning, we knew because of the disposition of the case, the fact that he received supervision would suggest that a firearm wasn't involved; and then luckily, we were able to confirm that with the help of the Probation Office. And everyone's in agreement that the Presentence Investigation Report will ultimately be corrected once Mr. Walsh is sentenced and a final amended and corrected Presentence Investigation Report will be prepared.

But I do think it is significant; and the fact that we now know that a firearm wasn't involved in that case, that wasn't another incident with Mr. Walsh having a firearm, I think again, we're asking you to revisit the issue. Again, the serious convictions that Mr. Walsh has in his background, he was significantly punished for those. It's not like he was getting away with anything. And I think that's something also to consider.

A lot of times a judge might move someone into another category because they feel like they haven't suffered the consequences of these -- of his prior bad acts and prior

convictions and that that should be at least reflected in an enhanced criminal history category, but that isn't the situation we have here, clearly. Mr. Walsh was convicted of the crimes he committed and received very substantial sentences.

The second sentence he received was -- again, was maxed out. It was a 6-to-30-year range. The judge maxed him out, gave him 30, and then doubled it because of his prior conviction, so gave him an extraordinarily high sentence.

So, this is an individual who does have certainly those two cases, very significant, but he was thoroughly punished for them, served his sentences. And now we know that one of the cases your Honor did use to take him out of category III, we now know the actual facts; and again, we would suggest that this isn't -- again, this is an individual who pled guilty to an original plea agreement, the expectation, even knowing all of these cases in his criminal history, the parties agreed that the appropriate and fair category was category III. The Probation Office, after they did their analysis, also concluded, again, recognizing the seriousness of the cases in his history, that he should be a category III.

So, now that we know that that case when he was 17 years old, now that we know it didn't involve a firearm, we should certainly keep him -- as was anticipated in the

plea agreement, we should keep him in category III. And that does make a difference on the Advisory Guideline range that your Honor has to consider when imposing a sentence.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Boyle. Again, I appreciate both sides' arguments. They're very well stated. I'm going to stick with my upward departure that placed Mr. Walsh in criminal history category IV.

Mr. Walsh received zero criminal history points for the murder of the police officer. That's paragraph 57. And that -- that crime, in and of itself, was sufficient to support the upward adjustment to category IV. Given the murder of the police officer, for which he received zero criminal history points, given the possession of the loaded Uzi, for which he received criminal history points, the robbery in paragraph 55 was just a cherry atop an already-iced cake in terms of the 4A1.3(a) departure.

So --

THE DEFENDANT: Even though --

THE COURT: Well, back -- I want to pick up where I left off back in October.

I wanted to justify the sentence that I gave, which is the 96 months on Count 4, the 96 months on Count 1 concurrent to the Count 4, and the 60 consecutive months on Count 2, for a total of 156 months. And I was going to explain why I arrived at that sentence when Mr. Walsh gave

his continued allocution and we decided to adjourn -- I decided to adjourn.

I would emphasize all the aggravating factors that I mentioned in discussing the 3553(a) considerations, and I would just emphasize the following: The seriousness of the crimes of conviction, Mr. Walsh's criminal history. It's been a true revolving door. And that's a cliche, but it's very apt in this case.

Mr. Walsh has shown an incorrigibility throughout his life; and he cannot be outside of prison for much time without committing further crimes, and not just any crimes, but either deadly, in the case of a murder, or potentially deadly crimes.

There's the matter of incapacitation, which is part of subsection (a)(2) of 3553(a), the need to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant. If Mr. Walsh gets out of prison while he's physically capable of committing an armed robbery or another violent crime, it's likely -- his history shows that it's likely that he will do so. For the sake of the people who could come into harm's way, that's a risk that I'm unwilling to take.

Mr. Walsh is a person who, despite having earned a 20-to-40-year indeterminate sentence for murder and then a 60-year sentence for armed robbery, went out and committed another armed robbery, the bank robbery, and was about to do

a second, with a loaded .357 revolver. And Mr. Walsh is somebody who's shown himself capable of putting five bullets into another person's chest, killing that person, and the person happened to be a police officer.

Mr. Walsh's criminal history, his inability to be out of prison without committing violent crimes, his in-court behavior prior to the sentencing hearing, the October sentencing hearing all show somebody who is unable or unwilling to govern himself accordingly.

And I -- I've been a judge for 10 years, over 10 years, and I've always bent over backward to avoid giving a sentence that would carry a non-trivial risk of effectively being a life sentence; but Mr. Walsh has -- has backed me and the criminal justice system into a corner.

And again, I'm putting myself back to what I was going to say in October. My giving Mr. Walsh the 156-month sentence is the only appropriate course in light of his criminal history, the seriousness of his offenses, present offenses, and the danger he poses to the community. And I would go so far as to say that it would be irresponsible of me not to impose that 156-year sentence.

And I do that while fully recognizing -- I was going to do that back in October while fully recognizing that the 156-month sentence, the 13-year sentence, which would result in Mr. Walsh being released in his early 80s, given that he's

already served about two-and-a-half years of his sentence, could be a life sentence. But I believe, for the reasons I gave, that that's not just an appropriate sentence, but the only appropriate sentence, again, putting myself back in the October time frame.

A \$300 special assessment is mandatory. Restitution, the \$3700 to the bank that was robbed on July 14th, I'm going to impose. I wasn't going to impose a fine on Mr. Walsh, given his inability to pay.

In terms of supervised release, I believe there is a five-year maximum term of supervised release; and I was going to impose a five-year term of supervised release, given the need to deter Mr. Walsh from committing further crimes upon what would have been his release had I -- if I give him a 156-month sentence, and the supervision and the benefits -- and the services that the Probation Office can provide.

I believe I asked Mr. Boyle at the beginning of this hearing on October 6th whether he was going to have any objections to the conditions of supervised release recommended by the Probation Office, and I believe he said no.

Mr. Boyle, I could be misremembering.

MR. BOYLE: Well, no, Judge. And we filed a written response. I think it would be Document 115 on the docket.

Our -- it was titled, "Sentencing Response." And I'm just reviewing it again for my benefit.

1 THE COURT: Oh, you know what, you're right, 2 Mr. Boyle. 3 MR. BOYLE: And I'm just confirming what you had 4 I think the only -- we don't have any objections to stated. 5 the mandatory conditions. We do not -- well, we do set forth 6 with some specificity which conditions we do not object to, 7 but then there are other various discretionary conditions that 8 they should not be imposed as they have no relevance to this 9 defendant or the nature of his offense and would serve no 10 purpose. 11 I guess we can go through them individually, or if 12 you want me to just put on the record the ones that we don't 13 have an objection to. 14 THE COURT: Yes. I see that you don't have an 15 objection to any of the mandatory conditions. 16 MR. BOYLE: Correct. 17 THE COURT: Discretionary conditions 4, 6, 8, 14 18 through 18, and 22 to 23. And in terms of the special 19 conditions, you have no objection to 5 through 7 or 10 and 11. 20 MR. BOYLE: Right. 21 THE COURT: You do object to the others. So, let's 22 go through the ones that there's an objection to. 23 MR. BOYLE: Well, if we need to, Judge. We're --

just kind of in an excess of caution, I don't think we're

objecting to any that Probation has actually recommended.

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There's just obviously this whole assortment of ones that can be recommended.

THE DEFENDANT: Three years.

MR. BOYLE: But we are -- we were just suggesting that the ones that aren't recommended should not be imposed because they just -- and I think Probation was correct in their analysis. They don't apply to this defendant. And we might have stated that because the government might be seeking conditions that Probation are not seeking, but I don't want to speak for them.

THE COURT: You know what, I think -- that's what I recall, but I just want to confirm that Probation has not recommended -- has not recommended anything that you would be objecting to.

MR. BOYLE: That is --

THE COURT: And the mandatory, it's just 1, 2, and 5, which you don't object to. Discretionary, we have 4, 6, 8, 14 through 18, 22 and 23, which you don't object to. And then special, we have 5 through 7, 10 and 11, which you don't object to.

So, it turns out my recollection was correct that -MR. BOYLE: That is correct, Judge. The one
objection the defendant does have would be to imposing the
maximum five-year term of supervised release. As an
alternative, we suggested a total of three -- three years of

supervised release on each count to run concurrently.

THE COURT: Okay. On that, given Mr. Walsh's criminal history and given what he has consistently said is his need for job training and services, I think the five-year maximum term is appropriate, again, for deterrence purposes because if Mr. Walsh were to re-offend upon release, he'd face a sentence not just in the new case, but a revocation sentence in this case.

And again, the Probation -- on the positive side, on the non-punitive or non-deterrent side, the Probation Office provides services to defendants who are released; and I think Mr. Walsh, if he were to be released, could avail himself of those services.

So, I'm going to go with the full five years. Under United States --

MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Your Honor --

THE COURT: Yes?

MR. CHRISTIANSEN: I'm very sorry, Judge. This is Jason Christiansen from Probation. Looking through my paperwork and documentation here, with specific regard to Count 4, I believe there may be a supervised release range that tops out at three years, both statutorily and under the Guidelines.

So, I realize that's a distinction without a difference because of the other counts of conviction, but

may I --

THE COURT: Yes, right.

MR. CHRISTIANSEN: So, would it be possible for it to be five years on the other two counts, but three years on Count 4?

THE COURT: Yes. It would be five years on Counts 1 and 2, and three years, which is the maximum, on Count 4.

MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: And I misspoke when I said there was a five-year maximum on all three counts.

Mr. Boyle, under *United States versus Anglin*, the defendant -- which is 846 F.3d 954 at 969 to 970, the defendant has the option. If the defendant would like for me to read all the supervised release conditions on the record, I'd be happy to do so. Alternatively, if Mr. Walsh would like to waive the reading of those conditions, that's his option as well.

MR. BOYLE: Well, Mr. Walsh, we've filed a written pleading wherein we did not object to the various conditions as recommended by Probation. I think the judge has indicated that he's only going to impose the conditions that were contemplated by Probation.

Do you understand those conditions and would waive the formal reading of each specific condition?

THE DEFENDANT: I'll waive the formal reading.

MR. BOYLE: Thank you, Judge.

Thank you, Mr. Walsh.

THE COURT: Sure. The government has a motion for preliminary order of forfeiture as to the .357 revolver. Any objection to that, Mr. Boyle?

MR. BOYLE: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. I'll grant that motion and enter the preliminary order of forfeiture.

Under *United States versus Harris*, 718 F.3d 698 at 703, footnote 2, I'm supposed to say whether I would have given the same sentence -- and again, I repeat I'm putting myself back in the October time frame -- would have given the same sentence had I agreed with the defendant on the disputed Guideline issues. And there are times when I answer that question yes, but in this instance, I'm going to answer the question no.

With respect to one of the Guideline issues, even if I found that the felon in possession, which was Count 4, was not in connection with an attempted bank robbery for purposes of 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), I would have imposed the same sentence because even if Mr. Walsh's conduct did not technically qualify as an attempted bank robbery, he clearly was about to commit an armed bank robbery. So, the conduct was the same, and the conduct would have resulted in the same sentence, with or without that offense level enhancement.

Second, even if I did not give an upward departure under 4A1.3(a), I still would have imposed the same sentence because Mr. Walsh's actual criminal history is what it is. So, instead of it being a departure under 4A1.3(a), it would have been a variance under 3553(a).

The criminal history amply demonstrates that Mr. Walsh needs to be incapacitated. Here's somebody who was in his early 70s who committed one very well-planned armed bank robbery and was about to commit another. He certainly -- as somebody in his 70s, certainly has his aches and pains and ailments that people get when they advance in age, when they reach their 70s; but he's in relatively decent shape.

And a 156-month sentence would -- if he earns his good time, would have resulted in him being released in his early 80s, at which point the risk of his being able to commit more crimes would have been diminished, not eliminated by any stretch, but diminished.

So -- and then there were various admonishments about appeal rights and the like that I was going to do at the October hearing, but before I do that -- well first, we've been going for about an hour 10 minutes. Does anybody need to take a break?

MR. BOYLE: No, thank you, your Honor.

MR. VEATCH: Not the government, your Honor.

THE COURT: In the minute order that I entered on

October 6th, I asked the parties to address whether a departure or a variance based on Mr. Walsh's remarks, his supplemental allocution at that hearing is permitted, and if so, whether it's warranted.

Probation, I don't know if you have a view on this; but I'd ask for your views, if you have them and would like to share them.

MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Judge, subsequent to having this case reassigned to me from a former presentence investigation officer, I went through the Sentencing Guidelines. I looked at potential offense level adjustments and potential departure grounds; and I didn't find anything, either specifically within the Sentencing Guidelines or case law that I reviewed, that necessitated a variance or a departure.

I guess to my way of thinking, Judge, your Honor is in a unique position to assess what has taken place in this case; and I do not advocate on behalf of the Probation Office any departure or variance based on what has occurred, with full appreciation for the fact that your Honor is in a unique position to assess whether that's an appropriate path forward.

THE COURT: Government, what are your thoughts?

MR. VEATCH: Thank you, your Honor. Your Honor, recognizing the defendant has attempted to display some explanation for his conduct on October 6th, the fact is he made some very specific threats to harm your Honor, your

1 Honor's family, the prosecutor, and the Probation Office.

2 I was not the prosecutor at that time, but having read the

3 | transcript even cold, there are some very harsh threats that

4 appear to indicate at the very least the defendant was

5 | attempting to obstruct his sentencing, to the extent that he

6 was attempting to influence your Honor, the Probation Office

7 | that would be supervising him if he was to be released, or

the prosecutor who still had arguments to make, or your Honor,

who still had portions of the sentence to impose.

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We think that the Court would be well-justified, under 3C1.1, if it sought to increase the offense level by two levels for attempted obstruction of the sentencing proceeding relating to the instant offense and relating to the defendant's offense of conviction or offense conduct. That would result at a high end sentence -- or a sentencing range of 92 to 115 months, plus a 60-month for the 924(c) charge, which would get you to a 152-to-175-month range.

We do believe that the Court would be well-justified were it to increase the defendant's offense level, either under 3C1.1, or by analogy, through a variance, to reflect the fact that defendant made those incredibly threatening, prolonged statements that, unlike most allocutions, allowed the Court to actually see what was going on inside the defendant's head.

You know, it is something that he was being honest

in portraying to the Court his true feelings and his true inability to control himself, even in the most controlled settings, even when it was completely against his best interest, which is a big concern. As the defendant has less to lose, if you will, as he gets older and perhaps has less opportunities, there is that concern that he will give in to his less-controlled impulses.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Boyle?

MR. BOYLE: Yes, Judge. In making this argument, I'm not in any way minimizing or rationalizing anything that was said by Mr. Walsh at that original sentencing hearing. I would just -- my only attempt would be to try to put it into some context, which I think Mr. Walsh has done himself already.

I think that's really a good starting point, the fact that Mr. Walsh has come back before your Honor to continue his sentencing and has shown no behavior like that, has not been disrespectful, has not shown any anger. He has been polite. He has been thoughtful. He has made further arguments on his own behalf in mitigation. And I think that should tell us all something, tell your Honor something, that that was an uncharacteristic outburst.

Obviously, any defendant who is anticipating his sentencing, there's hopes. There's expectations. And again,

this is -- I think he was -- I think he's 73 now. I think he was 72 back in October. And he had hopes that by accepting responsibility, by pleading guilty, by waiving his right to a trial, he would be receiving some benefit.

We also had hopes, as you've already referenced, of convincing your Honor not to impose the four additional points for the attempted bank robbery that he did not plead guilty to, but now he's finding out during the sentencing that that is going to be used against him. It is going to be used to increase the offense level and call for a higher sentence than he had hoped for. That's a disappointment.

And again, none of this -- I mean, we are going to, I assume, have an appeal. We are going to challenge some of your Honor's findings, as we've articulated orally and in pleading. It's just putting yourself in Mr. Walsh's shoes, again, you have hopes and expectations when you finally get your day in court and you're going to be sentenced, and it was, frankly, one disappointment after another.

The attempted robbery is going to be used against him to enhance his sentence. He's going to be taken out of his anticipated criminal history category and put in a higher criminal history category. And essentially, about -- you know, worst-case scenario, as far as the Guideline range sentence, it sounded like that's going to be imposed, and that was greatly disappointing, greatly frustrating, and

greatly upsetting.

That's -- I can't speak to the actual things

Mr. Walsh or -- said. I am just trying to put it in context.

And then he has his outburst, but then he has come back again before your Honor and has conducted himself, I think, in an entirely appropriate way.

You have indicated you're going to impose a sentence of 156 months. Even with the enhancement that the government has suggested, that would fall within that range that they've spoken of. But even if you were to consider that, you're essentially already at that kind of a number with 156 months, and so obviously, we feel that that 156 months is more than necessary in this case. So, you're already there. So, I don't think you need to find any other enhancement to Mr. Walsh's sentence.

Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: Thank you. What I'm going to do now is -- well, why don't I -- why don't I ask -- there are two questions I have to resolve. The first is: Is the Court able to, am I able to impose a sentence different than 156 months, given that that was the sentence that I said I was going to give? And then the next question -- if the answer to the first question is yes, I am able to give a different sentence, the question is: Should I?

And I was going to address both of those questions.

Obviously, the first is logically anterior to the second. But before I -- before I do that, I probably should turn the mic over to Mr. Walsh to see if he has anything that he would like to say in addition to what he has already said in October and earlier this morning.

THE DEFENDANT: I'd like to say that any outburst that I made like that, it was just like spontaneous combustion. You know? It was something that was not really thought out. It wasn't planned. I didn't do it intentionally. It just happened.

And I don't know you. You don't really know me. You know? You know me by a record, but you don't really know me. I don't really know you.

I don't -- I wouldn't have seeked to do anything, I wouldn't have said anything had -- from my understanding, 123 months -- okay. There was two points. It went to 138 months. If I had got the other point from you, it would have been 123 months, according to the plea. That's what I was thinking.

You didn't allude to any of that. You never alluded to that. You never -- you get what I'm saying? So, I'm thinking, "Now where's he going?" Then you throw in an upward departure, and you're taking stuff that's well older and should have no bearing on what's going on at this time.

You seem to think it does. I understand your

reasoning. Looking at my record, I -- and I went over it. I've looked at it. I could see your assessment of my record and the fact that I've been back and forth through this entire system too many times.

I'm trying to plead with you to get a sentence much less than 156 months, seriously. I -- 123 months, which is what I would have gotten without anything, if you'd have gave me that point and said, "Well, listen, according to the Guidelines, I'm going to sentence you to 123 months," I wouldn't have made no protest.

If you would have said, "I'm not going to give you that point, but I'm going to give you 138 months according to the plea," I would have said not -- nothing. You understand? I would have said nothing.

But when you went to use something that you're going to take off anyway, namely the attempted bank robbery, it's coming off the sentence. Why would you use those points against me and then under that other statute go for an upward departure?

Now, to me, it seemed like that was the original plea that was offered to me on the first time go-around. It had 156 months or something like that, 13 years, on the original first plea that was offered. I turned that down. I didn't turn down the 123 months and the fact that I could appeal the 924(c).

I wouldn't have had anything to say, but you went with an upward departure, and you upped my category to a IV.

To me, it just -- it just made -- it unhinged me from there.

My thoughts just went absolutely crazy from there.

And then when you were going to give the justification for the high end, I just -- I threw the verbal bag of shit in your face is what I did. I realize that.

(Audio breaks up) -- had no -- there was feelings there.

It was feelings -- my hurt, my pain, that I did what I did.

You know? Should I be punished for it? I don't know.

I'm thinking that you're in a position you can do what you want to do with my sentence. If you feel I should get whatever I'm going to get, that's your feelings. I can't -- I'm trying to influence you to give me something under the Guidelines so that I can get out and do something right. You know? I'm not trying to stay in prison the rest of my life.

I'm 74 years old. Nobody knows how long they're going to live. I don't know how old you are, but, hey, nobody lives forever. People die. I don't need to die in prison or over this thing that I never intended to hurt anybody with.

Yeah, my background's bad. Yeah, I did what I did with that police officer. There was a lot of other things that were involved with that that you don't know anything about. I don't really want to get off into that. That was

something that was 52 years old or better back.

Was it justified? No, it probably wasn't justified. Did I pay for it? Yes, I paid for it. Did I pay for the other thing when they tried to kill me with time? Yeah, I paid dearly for that.

I was out of focus when I came out after -- if you do that much time, you're going to be out of focus. Trust me. Doing more time is -- I don't know. All I'm trying to do is say that I'm not going to -- I'm not going to do anything like that. If I get the vocational training, I'm going to stay clear of the law, period. I don't want to be coming back in.

I get out at a reasonable time, I'm going to try to do the best that I can do. That's all I can do. That's all I can say. I'm going to try to do the best that I can, the best of my ability. That's all I can do.

Like I say, I apologize for that. I was in a bad frame of mind. I was looking at those other two cases that -- and I realized later that, yeah, those two cases you went under the Guidelines, but their criminal history is not my criminal history. That was them. That's not me. And I could understand your justification by law to do that.

Now, it's not going to make any difference to anybody else out there listening or anything else if I got five years or 50 years. It's not going to make any difference to anybody else but me. Yeah, you've got a -- how would you say, it's

almost like a procedure to look out for the welfare of the public. I understand this. And I understand that you can be justified and give me whatever sentence you wish to give me, period.

I'm saying that I would like to get a second chance on this one. You know? I'm a little bit older now, and I just don't want to be dying in prison over something that shouldn't be an offense to die over. Okay? I don't believe that dying in prison is going to benefit anybody else. It's going to kill me, but it's not going to benefit anybody else.

Now, if I was really that far out of control, I wouldn't have had control ever since then. I made the emotional outburst, sure, because I was super upset because you were giving me something well beyond the Guidelines, and it wasn't what I pled to. You know?

If you sign -- 95 percent of the people, when they sign a plea, they get usually what they're -- they're at, or they get below the Guidelines a little bit, a little leeway for accepting responsibility, that whole nine yard thing.

With my background, I could see the justification and almost the necessity for you to impose the sentence that you did. What I'm trying to do is to get you to impose a sentence that's far less than that, and -- because I am as old as I am, and I'm not truly trying to die in prison. Okay? Not over that.

If I had done really some other bad thing and took hostages or really, you know, did something crazy, I'd understand it. I wouldn't have said anything -- or I wouldn't say because saying anything, that would really tip the balance one way or another. I'm just trying to live like a normal human being. That's all. That's all I was trying to do.

I know I stepped off the mark, but I can step right back on the mark if I get the proper training. If I get an over amount of time, I could die in prison. What's that going to serve? That's going to serve, well, hey, you killed this guy with time. That's what that's going to serve. It's not going to serve any real justice at all.

If you're looking at even-handed justice, as opposed to something that -- you know, you could -- yeah, certainly, you can do that. You can do -- under that -- under the Guidelines and under whatever you wish, you can impose whatever sentence you wish to impose. I have no control over that. I'm just trying to plead that you give me a less sentence than 156 months. That's what I'm trying to plead, something that's -- that I can do -- that I can get out, a good chance.

60 months would have done that. If you were -- would have came with the 10 years, we could have tried to argue down to getting the five years, so that -- 60 months is blown up. I've got 30 months in now. In 30 months' time, I can obtain

the vocational training that I need to get, and I can get a livable wage out there, and I don't have to be coming back to this again.

If I had a livable wage out there, I wouldn't have been back here after 30-some years. Believe me. I was trying to do the best I could, and I failed; but I realize my failure is not getting the vocational training.

I did try to take -- I took two job readiness courses when I was out of work. One was for a truck driver -- not truck driver, but a forklift driver, and the other was for a porter. Okay? Now, I received certificates for those that I never made any mention about. Okay?

The one, they didn't tell me anything about anything. I had to go 16 weeks, that's four months, with no pay to learn -- to be a forklift driver. That would have only got me 14, \$15 an hour more -- I mean, 14, \$15. It would have been a couple of dollars more than I was making.

I put in another job readiness course somewhere else for a janitor's job. Again, 16 weeks course. I couldn't do it. I had to keep working to keep the rent and keep everything else up.

Yeah, I was getting Social Security, but they cut payments. They cut payments if you're working under that -- under that -- under that guidelines that they've got for Social Security, if you get disability from mental or you've

been locked up a long time.

They took my Link card. From 192, they put it down to \$15 a month because I was working. This is like a month or so, almost two months after I was out. They cut that because I was working. They got a computer company, I guess, and they -- they looked at it, and they said, "Well, we're cutting this."

They take the 750, and they cut \$75 off of it to where I'm getting 675. Now I get another notice that says that they're going to cut another 75 over a certain amount, and I made over that certain amount, and they were going to cut another \$75. Now you're starting to see where I'm coming from. It just all piled up on me all at one time, and I lost it. I lost it.

But I didn't want to hurt anyone. You can see that by the fact -- if you look at the video, you see how fast I moved. I just wanted them to see that the gun was there. That's it. I didn't wish to hurt anybody.

Yeah, I said, "I'm not playing," because she laid there and closed the drawer on me. If you look at the bank robbery and look at clip 5, you'll see that from their point of view, she closed the drawer on me. First I asked for the money. She closed the drawer and looked at me. Yeah, I pulled the gun up and did that and said, "I'm not playing." She said, "Okay. I'll get the money for you."

When I leave, also, the other woman that was in question, when I first came in under clip 5, she's on the phone. She never gets off the phone. She's not alarmed. She had me go down to the other tellers. I go down to the other two tellers. One of them thinks that the gun is not real. Okay. Regardless of that, after I leave, if you're looking at the thing, they're laughing about it because people -- you know, they --

MR. VEATCH: Your Honor, this is the government.

The government respectfully objects at this point. None of this is going to the Court's initial question.

THE COURT: Yeah. I'm going to -- this is actually -- because there have been changed circumstances, I wanted to give Mr. Walsh a chance to give a further allocution; and so he doesn't really need to confine his remarks to answering the two questions that I had. This is not legal argument. Mr. Boyle already presented legal argument. This is further allocution in light of what happened towards the tail end of the October 6th hearing.

Go ahead, Mr. Walsh.

THE DEFENDANT: Is there any way that you could see clear to give me a much lighter sentence than 156 months? That's what I would like to ask, in reality. I'm 74 years old. You know all the circumstances of everything because I've put it in front of you.

1 If that fact of that picture would have went in front 2 of a jury, they would not have been able to determine that 3 there were any bullets in the gun, period, from that picture. 4 It would have given reasonable doubt to the 924(c), period. 5 But I can't do anything with the 924(c). I can't do anything 6 with anything. It's all been covered legally. 7 All I can do is try to plead my case to say that my 8 age and the fact that -- the fact that I'm just -- you know, 9 I just want a chance, that's all, at life. I don't want to 10 die in prison because of my background. 11 You know, I mean -- what can I say? You know? 12 you're within legal rights to do all that you said you could 13 do. You know? And I have not got -- well, I haven't got 14 anything that I can say against that. You know? Nothing. 15 So, whatever you're going to do, you'll do, and 16 that's it. I have nothing further to say. 17 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Anything further 18 from Probation? 19 MR. CHRISTIANSEN: No, Judge, unless there are any 20 specific questions that you have for me. 21 THE COURT: Okay. Anything further from the 22 government? 23 MR. VEATCH: Your Honor, I guess the question, as 24 your Honor posed it, is whether you now have the authority to 25 impose a different sentence; and I think much of that hinges

on whether -- certainly, you could have after the October 6th hearing, as the sentencing was still in motion. You were still receiving argument on issues.

I think the greater issue now becomes whether, in your Honor's recitation of the conditions of a sentence that you would have imposed is the question of whether that was your -- the Court, in fact, imposing a sentence in that moment and now after the fact seeing whether the imposed sentence needs to be modified.

If the Court was merely indicating its intention of what it anticipated imposing, I think arguably, that's a different story. But to the extent that the Court has already imposed a sentence, now that it has gone through all the factors, the motions, the forfeiture motions, the conditions, if the Court views that as having imposed the sentence, I believe we are past that; and now, you know, modification would have to be under Rule 35 for clear error. I think much of it hinges on the Court's intent in relaying the terms of a sentence.

THE COURT: Mr. Boyle?

MR. BOYLE: Yes, Judge. I think I have a similar analysis. I've been looking at Rule 32. I think you have -- you essentially imposed the sentence back in October. You have re-articulated the same sentence and have re-articulated your reasoning and the reasons why you're imposing that

156-month statement -- sentence.

So, I think there were, I guess, various approaches or things that could have been done in response to Mr. Walsh's statements back in October, but I don't think those steps were taken. I think -- I think both parties looked at the idea as if you could somehow use that as a possible enhancement.

The government today has suggested that possibly under Section 3C1.1, an enhancement to the offense level could be imposed; but again, even if you were to do that, a 156-month motion is already within that range.

And again, what Mr. Walsh has said in subsequent court appearances and what he has just stated again today, it's just -- he was -- had great hopes for a lower sentence; and apparently, again, your Honor apparently imposed -- essentially sentenced him to 156 months back in October, and now we've just kind of -- I think certain things have changed that were in Mr. Walsh's favor, such as the amendments and corrections to the Presentence Investigation Report.

And for the first time in my career, I filed a sentencing memorandum where I asked for a higher sentence than I did in the original pleading, and I think that also suggests that Mr. Walsh has come a bit down the road as far as understanding the seriousness of his criminal history and the reasons why what we originally asked for was the 60-month sentence and one day served, we have now come back and we're

asking for a 96-month sentence, which for various reasons, your Honor is not prepared to impose.

Instead, you've stated you plan on imposing the sentence of 156 months, and I think that is where you should -- we're objecting to that sentence, obviously, and I anticipate Mr. Walsh will want to appeal that sentence; but I think -- I think it encompasses all of the things that you have carefully considered, and that's why you're imposing that sentence. And I don't think Mr. Walsh's outburst back in October should change that, or perhaps can't change that. I think the sentence has been imposed.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Your Honor, this is Probation again. I feel I need to clarify for myself and for Probation a little bit more. May I do that, sir?

THE COURT: Of course.

MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Okay. I guess from the standpoint of the application of the Sentencing Guidelines, the Probation Office, the way we're trained to sort of approach things is to use the relevant conduct analysis, and the most simple way in looking at it vis-a-vis my approach is that we look at conduct that occurs in preparation for an offense of conviction, net conduct that obviously spans the offense itself, and then any attempts by a defendant to avoid responsibility for their conduct.

I guess the way that I view this situation, at least in terms of whether or not there's propriety in the realm of adjusting his offense level based on his statements during that supplemental allocution is that I can only imagine what he was thinking at the moment, but it's almost as though the penalty has been imposed, at least in his mind. So, he wasn't avoiding responsibility for anything at that point because the penalty had already been imposed.

I can't know for sure exactly what he was thinking when he was saying the things that he was saying, but that is my rationale in suggesting that the Court may not be required to revisit the offense level computations or to revisit issues pertaining to variances or departures. That's the reason for my saying that I think the Court is in the unique position to assess the propriety of those types of adjustments.

I hope that makes it -- things a little bit more clear.

THE COURT: I understand what you're saying.

That was kind of directed towards the government's argument, so I don't know if the government has anything in addition that it would like to say. You don't have to, but if you would like to, go ahead.

MR. VEATCH: Certainly, your Honor. And I agree with Probation's sentiments -- I should say Probation certainly raises a very interesting way of looking at the statements.

We would just disagree that sentence was imposed during the October 6 proceeding.

THE COURT: Right. The first question is whether the 156 months that I articulated, but did not fully justify at the October 6th hearing, and what I did at the beginning of today's hearing is I said what I was going to say at the October 6th hearing, with a couple of adjustments, the adjustments being to what the armed robbery was in paragraph 55 and whether or not that would impact the upward departure from category III to category IV, and then whether or not the gun was loaded in the first robbery.

So, the question is: Having uttered the words "156 months," is that it? Is that something that is set in stone?

The answer to that question is no, at least in my view. Criminal Rule 35(c) refers to the oral announcement of the sentence, and the Seventh Circuit has held that the oral announcement of a sentence means that all components of a sentence must be stated in the oral sentence. And that's *United States versus McMillan*, 777 F.3d 444 at 451.

That obviously didn't happen on October 6th. I didn't -- well first, I didn't fully -- I didn't give my complete justification for the 156 months; but even more than that, I didn't say anything about supervised release, about a fine, about the forfeiture. So, I didn't come close to giving

all components of a complete sentence. And I recognize that at page 47, lines 20 through 24 of the October 6th transcript.

Just moving on, in *United States versus Cheatham*, 527 Fed. App. 556 at 557, the Seventh Circuit stated that a district court may spread out the sentencing process over more than one date. And *Cheatham* didn't address the particular situation that I'm facing right now, that we're facing right now; but the *Cheatham* unpublished decision does cite a Tenth Circuit decision that does speak to our circumstances.

It's *United States versus Luna-Acosta*, 715 F.3d 860, where the Seventh Circuit -- I'm sorry, where the district court imposed one sentence, and then -- custodial sentence, and then imposed a different sentence. And the -- and then got cold feet, and the district court went back to the original sentence on the ground that the district court was stuck with the originally articulated sentence.

And the Tenth Circuit held that that was not the case, that the district court could have, over the course of the sentencing hearing, imposed what the district court had articulated in the second sentence. And the Tenth Circuit explained that Rule 35(c) defines sentencing as the oral announcement of the sentence, and that nothing in the rule requires or suggests that whatever term or terms of imprisonment the district court first utters during a hearing is to be treated as the sentence for purposes of the rule.

And that's at page 865.

And then the Tenth Circuit held that despite the continuance in the hearing, the sentence was not final until the end of what the district court -- until the end of the second hearing that the district court conducted. And the Tenth Circuit said, which is very pertinent here, "Most important is the very fact that the district court continued the first hearing without finalizing all the terms of the sentence."

The Tenth Circuit cited with approval the Fifth Circuit's decision in *United States versus Gerezano-Rosales*, which is 692 F.3d 393. In that case, the district court announced a sentence of 71 months. The defendant made remarks that were much milder than Mr. Walsh's remarks on October 6th, and then the district court said, "Okay. I'm going to give you a 108-month sentence."

And the Fifth Circuit affirmed the 108-month sentence, reasoning that the district court's initial oral announcement of the defendant's sentence did not constitute a binding sentence and, therefore, did not strip the court of its ability to change the initial formulation and that the court changed its initial formulation before it adjourned the sentencing hearing. And that's the situation we have here.

And the Tenth Circuit, in *Luna-Acosta*, also cited a First Circuit case, *United States versus Burgos-Andujar*,

275 F.3d 23 at 30 to 31, which presented a very similar situation to the Fifth Circuit circumstances in *Gerezano-Rosales* and to the circumstances we face here, where the sentencing judge initially said 40 days, the defendant interrupted and made inadvisable comments to the court, and then the court raised the sentence to 60 days.

And the First Circuit said the sentencing judge was fully justified in considering the defendant's full allocution, which included her comments during the second part of the allocution. And because of the way the hearing developed, the 40-day sentence was functionally a tentative sentence.

And to the same effect is *United States versus Ochoa*, 809 F.3d, 453 at 458, which is the Ninth Circuit.

So, that's our situation here, and Mr. Walsh's remarks towards the end of the October 6th hearing was a continued allocution under Rule 32.1(4)(A)(ii). So, it is within my discretion under the rules to impose a sentence different than the 156-month sentence that I initially articulated.

As to whether I will do so, we've been going for two hours right now. There's been a lot said during this hearing. And in fairness to Mr. Walsh, and in fairness to the government, and in fairness to the public, and in the interests of justice, I need to reflect on what was said,

rather than simply process it on the fly and decide right now.

And the last thing I wanted to do coming in to this sentencing hearing was to continue the hearing once again because we've been with each other a lot and it's time to bring this matter to a close; but I think I would be doing a disservice to Mr. Walsh, to the government, to the interests of justice if I didn't take time to reflect on everything that was said during this hearing. And I don't have the opportunity to do so on the fly.

So, Jackie, I don't know if we can propose a time next week when we can get together, or the week after.

First let me ask the lawyers, are there any dates over the next two weeks that you're not available?

You're on mute.

MR. VEATCH: Not from the government, your Honor. Thank you.

MR. BOYLE: Judge, I have something virtually every morning, but I can usually make a little bit later in the day work on every day. I do have a continued evidentiary hearing on the 22nd before Judge Lee, so I'd prefer not that day.

THE CLERK: I'll look at our calendar.

THE COURT: Yeah, Jackie, I could do it any afternoon other than the late afternoon on the Thursday of next week and of the following week.

THE CLERK: Okay. How about January 20th at

1 1:00 p.m.? 2 MR. BOYLE: That works for the defendant. 3 MR. VEATCH: Works for the government, your Honor. 4 THE COURT: All right. Then we'll get back together 5 on January 20th. And I want to thank counsel for your -- and 6 the Probation Office for all of your arguments and input on 7 these difficult matters. MR. BOYLE: And, Judge --9 MR. VEATCH: Your Honor --10 MR. BOYLE: -- can I just ask for a little clarity? 11 I mean, you've already determined that you can -- you're not 12 saying you will, but that you could impose a greater sentence 13 based upon Mr. Walsh's statements. Is there anything else we 14 should be thinking about? 15 No. I'll certainly -- if you have more THE COURT: 16 to say on whether I should, I'm happy to hear you out on the 17 20th. 18 MR. BOYLE: Okay. I mean, that would be over our 19 objection, and we will revisit that, I suppose, when we 20 reconvene. 21 THE COURT: Yeah. And you're not -- if you do make 22 arguments on that point, you're not waiving your position that 23 I'm stuck with the 156-month sentence. 24 MR. BOYLE: Thank you, Judge.

MR. VEATCH: Your Honor, on behalf of the government,

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I should have made clear, certainly, I was telling the Court
what the range would be if the acceptance -- I'm sorry, if the
obstruction came in. The government's position is that it
should be increased to that high end of whatever the Guideline
range would be with the obstruction enhancement, or as of
right now preliminarily, 175.
         THE COURT:
                     Right.
         MR. VEATCH: I just wanted to make clear that that
was on the record, your Honor.
         THE COURT:
                     I understand.
         MR. CHRISTIANSEN: And, your Honor, is there anything
that you require from the Probation Office at present?
         THE COURT:
                     No.
         THE DEFENDANT: Could I say something, just --
         THE COURT: Again, I'd advise you not to.
                                                    I'm not
going to stop you.
         MR. BOYLE: Mr. Walsh --
         THE DEFENDANT:
                        Okav.
         MR. BOYLE: Mr. Walsh, if you have anything you want
to say to me, I will request a legal call as soon as we hang
up.
         THE DEFENDANT: Okay.
         MR. BOYLE: I think you've been heard today; and we
will confer, and we'll get prepared for the next hearing.
         THE DEFENDANT: The thing that's happened, what I'm
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| 1 | trying to do is remember, I had just had that information |
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| 2 | from two |
| 3 | MR. BOYLE: Mr. Walsh, we can address that together |
| 4 | on a legal call, and if you provide me with that |
| 5 | documentation, I can submit it to the Court. |
| 6 | THE DEFENDANT: All right. |
| 7 | MR. BOYLE: Thank you. |
| 8 | THE COURT: All right. Thank you. |
| 9 | MR. BOYLE: Thank you, everyone. |
| 10 | MR. VEATCH: Thank you. |
| 11 | THE DEFENDANT: Thank you. |
| 12 | (Which were all the proceedings heard.) |
| 13 | CERTIFICATE |
| 14 | I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from |
| 15 | the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter. |
| 16 | |
| 17 | /s/Charles R. Zandi February 5, 2021 |
| 18 | Charles R. Zandi Date Official Court Reporter |
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